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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the past two years, there have been several significant 
developments in labor and employment law, both on the state and 
federal levels. Because developments in both state and federal 
law likely will have a profound impact on employers and employ-
ees throughout Virginia, they warrant significant discussion in 
this survey. 
In addition to examining notable decisions from the Supreme 
Court of the United States, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit, and the United States District Courts for 
the Eastern District and Western District of Virginia, this survey 
also discusses decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia regard-
ing employment issues as they relate to state law. 
Because this article constitutes a survey of labor and employ-
ment law, it necessarily is limited in depth as well as substantive 
and temporal scope. Specifically, this article focuses on develop-
ments occurring over the prior two years, since January 2011. 
II. SOCIAL MEDIA
Social media, including Facebook, Twitter, and other social 
networking sites, now affects the daily lives of Americans, and 
employers and employees are no exception. As social media con-
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tinues to expand, both employers and employees should be aware 
of the potential legal effects of their social media conduct. 
The Eastern District of Virginia recently addressed individual 
social media conduct in rejecting a claim by employees that “lik-
ing” a political figure on Facebook constitutes free speech.
1
 In 
Bland v. Roberts, Judge Jackson granted summary judgment for 
the defendant, a sheriff who allegedly fired several of his employ-
ees in retaliation for “liking” his political opponent on Facebook.
2
 
Following his reelection, the sheriff declined to retain the six 
plaintiff employees and an additional six deputies on grounds 
that their actions “hindered the harmony and efficiency of the Of-
fice.”
3
 The plaintiffs claimed that the sheriff failed to reappoint 
them in retaliation for their exercise of their First Amendment 
right to freedom of political speech.
4
 Despite the plaintiffs’ claims, 
Judge Jackson held that “liking” a political figure on Facebook 
does not amount to expressive speech as “merely ‘liking’ a Face-
book page is insufficient speech to merit constitutional protec-
tion.”
5
 Additionally, the court held that even if “liking” something 
on Facebook constitutes expressive speech, the plaintiffs did not 
sufficiently allege that such speech touched upon a matter of pub-
lic concern.
6
 
Judge Jackson distinguished this case from others, noting that 
courts have extended constitutional speech protections “to Face-
book posts [where the speech at issue consists of] actual state-
ments.”
7
 Likewise, the court noted that “Facebook posts can be 
considered matters of public concern.”
8
 Thus, despite the failure 
of the Bland plaintiffs, employees who post on political pages or 
discuss political topics on their own Facebook pages likely will be 
afforded First Amendment protection so long as: (i) the employee 
makes a substantive statement of public concern as a citizen ra-
ther than “a personal matter of personal interest” as an employee; 
(ii) the employee’s interest in speaking upon the matter out-
1. See Bland v. Roberts, No. 4:11cv45, 2012 WL 1428198, at *2–3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 24,
2012). 
2. Id. at *1.
3. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
4. Id. at *2.
5. Id. at *3.
6. See id. (footnote omitted).
7. Id. (emphasis added).
8. Id. at *4.
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weighs “the government’s interest in providing effective and effi-
cient services to the public;” and (iii) the employee’s speech was a 
substantial factor in the termination decision.
9
 
III. TITLE VII
A.  Retaliation 
Retaliation claims remain popular because of the generous pro-
tections Title VII affords employees. Because they frequently sur-
vive summary judgment and the underlying elements are com-
paratively easy for jurors to grasp, retaliation claims continue to 
enjoy increasing popularity. Three recent decisions, one from the 
Supreme Court and two from the Eastern District of Virginia, ex-
pand the scope of Title VII protections for retaliation claims and 
reinforce the efficacy of such claims.
10
 
First, in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, the Su-
preme Court expanded the definition of an “aggrieved” person to 
include third parties, who now can effectively claim retaliation 
under Title VII.
11
 The Court held that an employee was unlawful-
ly retaliated against when he was fired after his fiancée filed a 
gender discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (“EEOC”).
12
 The employee’s fiancée had filed a 
charge against the couple’s employer, alleging sex discrimina-
tion.
13
 The Court noted that an “aggrieved” person under Title VII 
includes any person with an interest arguably sought to be pro-
tected by the statute, abrogating a narrower lower court deci-
sion.
14
 Applying Title VII protections to a third party, the Court 
recognized that the employee at issue fell within the “zone of in-
terests” the statute was meant to protect.
15
 Specifically, the em-
9. See id. at *2–3 (quoting McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277–78 (4th Cir. 1998))
(discussing application of the Fourth Circuit’s three-prong test to determine whether an 
employment action violates an employee’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech). 
10. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011); Ed-
wards v. Murphy-Brown, L.L.C., 802 F. Supp. 2d 670 (E.D. Va. 2011); Coles v. Deltaville 
Boatyard, LLC, No. 3:10cv491-DWD, 2011 WL 1750896 (E.D. Va. May 6, 2011). 
11. See 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 868, 870 (citing Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v.
First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 495 (1998)). 
12. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 867, 870.
13. See id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 867.
14. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 869 (citing Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442
(1971)). 
15. See id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
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ployee was targeted directly by the employer as an unlawful reac-
tion to the fiancée’s sex discrimination claim.
16
 
In Edwards v. Murphy-Brown, L.L.C., the Eastern District of 
Virginia held in favor of a female employee who brought sexual 
harassment and retaliation claims against her employer by deny-
ing the employer’s motion to dismiss.
17
 Over the course of six 
years, this employee filed a series of complaints with her employ-
er regarding sexually offensive behavior, including an incident in 
which a male employee was caught spying on the plaintiff and 
another female employee who were changing in the women’s 
shower room, by using peep holes he had drilled in the door.
18
 
When the incident was reported to the employer’s human re-
sources department, the employee was belittled and subsequently 
reassigned; the offending employees were never reprimanded.
19
 In 
rejecting the employer’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the 
plaintiff plausibly alleged “materially adverse conduct that would 
dissuade a reasonable person from raising a claim of discrimina-
tion.”
20
 In support of its decision, the court cited the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. 
v. White, in which the Court held that a job reassignment may be
actionable retaliation under Title VII.
21
 Importantly, the Edwards 
court took a broad view, considering “all circumstances,” before 
deciding that a reasonable juror could find the job reassignment 
to be “materially adverse.”
22
 
In a third case, the Eastern District of Virginia again ruled in 
favor of an employee on his claim of unlawful retaliation under 
Title VII.
23
 In Coles v. Deltaville Boatyard, LLC, an employee filed 
a charge with the EEOC against his former employer alleging 
that during his employment he was subjected to racial discrimi-
nation.
24
 The plaintiff’s former employer, Deltaville Boatyard, 
contacted Coles’s subsequent employers about the EEOC charge 
16. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
17. 802 F. Supp. 2d 670, 678 (E.D. Va. 2011).
18. See id. at 672 (citations and footnote omitted).
19. See id. (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 678.
21. Id. at 677 (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 71
(2006)). 
22. Id. at 677–78.
23. See Coles v. Deltaville Boatyard, LLC, No. 3:10cv491-DWD, 2011 WL 1750896, at
*8 (E.D. Va. May 6, 2011).
24. Id. at *1 (citation omitted).
2012] LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 205 
and warned the new employers that Coles might file a similar 
charge.
25
 Deltaville suggested that the employers “proceed with 
restraint and caution” towards Coles, or face similar “trouble.”
26
 
In response, Coles filed suit alleging that Deltaville’s contact with 
his subsequent employers constituted unlawful retaliation.
27
 The 
court discussed the Burlington Northern test, considering wheth-
er the employer’s act “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker 
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
28
 After 
framing the issue this way, the court concluded that Coles met 
the threshold, explaining that “an employee recently fired by one 
employer might be dissuaded from filing an EEOC charge for that 
termination if he knows that it would lead to a warning that he 
might do the same to subsequent employers.”
29
 The court denied 
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on this ra-
tionale.
30
 
B.  Race Discrimination 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ad-
dressed race discrimination in three recent decisions and held in 
the employer’s favor in all three.
31
 In evaluating the claims, the 
court focused on the reasonableness of the employers’ responses 
to complaints of discrimination and the employers’ non-
discriminatory reasons supporting their disciplinary decisions.
32
 
First, in EEOC v. Xerxes Corp., the Fourth Circuit addressed 
the reasonableness of an employer’s delayed response in address-
ing employees’ racial discrimination complaints.
33
 Although Afri-
can American assembly workers complained of racial slurs and 
pranks from their white coworkers by reporting these incidents to 
25. See id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
26. Id. at *1–2 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Id. at *2.
28. Id. at *6 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 548 U.S. at 61, 68) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
29. Id. at *7.
30. Id. at *8.
31. See Lauture v. Saint Agnes Hosp., 429 F. App’x 300, 309 (4th Cir. 2011); EEOC v.
Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 677 (4th Cir. 2011); Ali v. Energy Enter. Solutions, LLC, 414 
F. App’x 531, 532 (4th Cir. 2011). 
32. Lauture, 429 F. App’x at 306, 307; Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d at 676–77; Ali, 414 F.
App’x at 531–32. 
33. See 639 F.3d at 668.
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their shift supervisor,
34
 no immediate action was taken by the 
employer or its managers.
35
 Importantly, Xerxes had an anti-
harassment policy that required employees to report discrimina-
tion to both their shift supervisor and the plant manager.
36
 Alt-
hough none of the employees subject to discrimination reported 
the violations to the plant manager, the substance of the allega-
tions did work its way up through the management chain to the 
plant manager.
37
 In response to these complaints, Xerxes con-
ducted an investigation, interviewed those involved, and sus-
pended two of the offending employees for two days.
38
 Xerxes also 
warned the offending employees that future conduct in violation 
of the company’s anti-harassment policy would not be tolerated, 
and the company held additional anti-harassment training for all 
employees.
39
 
In a separate incident, an African American employee found a 
threatening note in his locker referencing the Ku Klux Klan.
40
 
Xerxes investigated the incident and reported it to the local sher-
iff, but no employee was found responsible.
41
 Nevertheless, Xerxes 
held a plant-wide meeting, informing all employees of the inci-
dent and the involvement of the sheriff’s department and remind-
ing all employees of the company’s anti-harassment policies.
42
 In 
light of the company’s response to both reported incidents, the 
Fourth Circuit held that the employer’s actions were “reasonably 
calculated to end the harassment and, therefore, reasonable as a 
matter of law.”
43
 
A second Fourth Circuit decision, Ali v. Energy Enterprise So-
lutions, LLC, involved claims that a former employee was (i) 
treated disparately based on his race (because the employer re-
voked plaintiff’s network privileges and paid him less than his 
coworkers) and (ii) subjected to a retaliatory discharge.
44
 In a per 
34. Id. at 662–63 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 661–63, 671.
36. Id. at 662 (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 662–63.
38. Id. at 664 (citation omitted).
39. Id. at 664–65 (citations and footnote omitted).
40. Id. at 665 (citation omitted).
41. Id. (footnote omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 671.
44. 414 F. App’x 531, 531–32 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
2012] LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 207 
curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
conclusion that plaintiff Ali’s disparate impact claim failed be-
cause he could not prove that others outside his protected class 
were disciplined less severely and because he could not rebut the 
employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the pay dif-
ferential.
45
 Moreover, Ali’s retaliation claim failed based on his re-
fusal to cooperate with the employer’s attempt to find a position 
suitable for reassignment.
46
 Because the plaintiff was unable to 
rebut the employer’s defenses supporting its nondiscriminatory 
rationale, the court affirmed summary judgment in the employ-
er’s favor.
47
 
Finally, in Lauture v. Saint Agnes Hospital, a former hospital 
employee advanced allegations of discrimination based on race 
and national origin, hostile work environment harassment, 
breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
constructive discharge.
48
 In an opinion written by retired Su-
preme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, sitting by designa-
tion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the hospital.
49
 Despite the plain-
tiff’s allegations that the hospital failed to investigate her dis-
crimination complaints and issued a report using the phrase 
“Mexican stand-off” in reference to her disputes with a coworker,
50
 
the court held that the actions were not “sufficiently severe and 
pervasive to create an objectively abusive atmosphere,” as re-
quired to support her hostile work environment claim.
51
 The court 
also held that Lauture failed to prove the hospital treated other 
employees differently (to support her discrimination claim), as 
her discipline was within the “range of discipline” the hospital 
typically imposed for similar employee errors.
52
 Next, the court 
dismissed Lauture’s breach of contract claim because, although 
45. Id. at 531 (citing Cook v. CSX Transp. Co., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1993)).
46. Id. at 532 (citing Montes v. Greater Twin Cities Youth Symphonies, 540 F.3d 852,
857–58 (8th Cir. 2008); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., 12 F.3d 1382, 1389 
(6th Cir. 1993)). 
47. See id.
48. 429 F. App’x 300, 302 (4th Cir. 2011).
49. Id. at 302, 309.
50. Id. at 307 & n.3 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id. at 307 (quoting Honor v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 383 F.3d 180, 191 (4th
Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 
F.3d 306, 316–18 (4th Cir. 2008)). 
52. Id. at 306 (quoting Cook v. CSX Transp. Co., 988 F.2d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 1993))
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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employee handbooks can constitute contracts, the hospital effec-
tively disclaimed contractual liability by the explicit terms of the 
handbook.
53
 Ultimately, because the plaintiff failed to carry her 
burden of proof, the court affirmed summary judgment in the 
hospital’s favor on all counts.
54
 
C.  Gender Discrimination, Sexual Harassment & Hostile Work 
Environment 
1. Gender Discrimination
In a recent controversial decision, the Supreme Court held in 
favor of mega-retailer Wal-Mart against a group of female em-
ployees alleging gender discrimination.
55
 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, the Court held that the evidence did not support the
plaintiffs’ allegation that the company operated under a general 
policy of discrimination, as required to permit certification of the 
plaintiff class.
56
 A group of 1.5 million current and former female 
Wal-Mart employees alleged that the company discriminated 
against them, particularly in promotion and compensation deci-
sions.
57
 Both the district court and court of appeals approved class 
certification for the women, but the Supreme Court held that cer-
tification of the class was not consistent with Rule 23(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that the class 
have common “questions of law or fact.”
58
 
Specifically, the Court held that the employees’ case lacked the 
requisite proof that the company operated under a general policy 
of discrimination.
59
 Wal-Mart’s official policy forbids sex discrimi-
nation with penalties for violations.
60
 The Court found the 
“[d]issimilarities” between the plaintiffs’ claims to be dispositive
61
 
53. See id. at 308–09 (citing Mayers v. Wash. Adventist Hosp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 743,
751 (D. Md. 2001)). 
54. Id. at 309.
55. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560–61 (2011).
56. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,
159 n.15 (1982)). 
57. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
58. See id. at ___, S. Ct. at 2547, 2550–51, 2556–57 (citation and footnote omitted).
59. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
60. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (citations omitted).
61. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in
the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)) (internal quotation marks 
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because the pay and promotion decisions were delegated to store 
managers.
62
 Consequently, the claim of each plaintiff would de-
pend on her specific circumstances, rather than a broader dis-
criminatory policy at the corporate level.
63
 The Court’s holding 
makes clear that future employee-plaintiffs seeking class certifi-
cation first must satisfy a narrowly construed commonality re-
quirement. 
In another recent case, the Fourth Circuit held in favor of an 
employer accused of gender-based discrimination.
64
 In Hoyle v. 
Freightliner, LLC, the court accepted overstaffing as a non-
discriminatory reason for reassigning a female employee to jani-
torial duties, despite her claim that the real motive was discrimi-
nation.
65
 While working as a tractor trailer truck assembler for 
Freightliner, the plaintiff’s male coworkers played pranks on her 
and posted publicly viewable and sexually provocative pictures 
around the workplace, including in the cafeteria and break 
room.
66
 The plaintiff complained about the inappropriate pictures 
to her supervisor, who in turn asked some of the employees to 
take them down; however, the plaintiff asserted that the harass-
ment continued, and she saw additional inappropriate pictures, 
including a screensaver posted by coworkers on a company com-
puter.
67
 Shortly after the screensaver incident, Freightliner trans-
ferred the plaintiff to a new position consisting mainly of janitori-
al duties.
68
 
In rebutting the claim of sex discrimination, Freightliner ar-
gued that the plaintiff’s involuntary transfer was motivated by 
her “undisputed . . . significant problems with absenteeism.”
69
 De-
spite a “last chance agreement” with Freightliner that any addi-
tional absenteeism would result in her immediate termination, 
the plaintiff failed to show up for work and called in sick after the 
start of her scheduled shift.
70
 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the 
omitted). 
62. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2554, 2560 (“Wal-Mart [was] entitled to individualized de-
terminations of each employee’s eligibility for backpay.”). 
63. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2555–56.
64. Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2011).
65. Id. at 337–38.
66. See id. at 326–27.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 327.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 327–28 (footnote omitted).
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district court’s determination that the plaintiff failed to “prove 
her prima facie case [of sex discrimination] because she has not 
identified any similarly situated employees who were treated 
more favorably while on a last chance agreement.”
71
 
This interpretation of similarly situated employees reaffirms 
the interpretation the Fourth Circuit established in its prior deci-
sions.
72
 Moreover, in dismissing the accompanying claim of retali-
ation, the Fourth Circuit held that, in light of the plaintiff’s con-
tinual absenteeism, Freightliner successfully “rebutted [the 
plaintiff’s] prima facie case by alleging legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for transferring and eventually terminating [her].”
73
 
2. Sexual Harassment and Hostile Work Environment
The Fourth Circuit recently allowed plaintiffs’ claims of sexual 
harassment to survive in three separate actions.
74
 In Harris v. 
Mayor of Baltimore, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of 
the district court, which granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants, despite evidence that company employees posted 
nude pictures in the workplace.
75
 The court held the female em-
ployees’ sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims 
were sufficiently supported because coworkers used sexual and 
profane language and posted nude and sexually explicit photos in 
public view.
76
 The profane language used by male coworkers con-
vinced the court that the harassment in the workplace was suffi-
ciently severe and pervasive to be actionable.
77
 
In the second case, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged a split be-
tween the circuit courts of appeal in the course of addressing 
same-sex, third-party sexual harassment.
78
 In EEOC v. Cromer 
71. Id. at 336–37 (quoting Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, No. 3:07-CV-00169, 2009 WL
2462098, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
72. See id. at 336 (citing Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 234 (4th Cir. 1999),
abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2002)). 
73. See id. at 337–38.
74. See Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 332 (4th Cir. 2012); Harris
v. Mayor of Balt., 429 F. App’x 195, 197 (4th Cir. 2011); EEOC v. Cromer Food Servs., Inc.,
414 F. App’x 602, 603 (4th Cir. 2011). 
75. See 429 F. App’x at 197, 198–99.
76. See id. at 201 (citations omitted).
77. See id. at 202.
78. See Cromer Food Servs., Inc., 414 F. App’x at 606 (citing Dunn v. Wash. Cnty., 429
F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2005); Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005); 
2012] LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 211 
Food Services, Inc., the Fourth Circuit vacated a district court 
award of summary judgment in the employer’s favor and held 
that the evidence was sufficient for the plaintiff’s claim to reach a 
jury.
79
 The EEOC brought the action on behalf of a male employee 
of Cromer Food Services who was responsible for stocking vend-
ing machines along a predefined route.
80
 One of the required stops 
was a hospital, where two male employees would taunt this indi-
vidual by calling him a homosexual and propositioning him.
81
 
When the employee reported the harassment, his supervisor 
“failed to take adequate action to combat the harassment on be-
half of the hospital employees.”
82
 Although the employer later of-
fered to switch the harassed employee’s shift to an earlier time, 
the court found such corrective action to be “too little, too late” in 
the wake of months of inaction between the employee’s initial re-
port of harassment and the eventual decision to transfer him.
83
 
As stated, the Fourth Circuit also acknowledged a split be-
tween the circuit courts of appeal regarding “whether an employ-
er may be liable for the activities of non-employees in a claim for 
sexual harassment.”
84
 In seeking to resolve this split, the court 
held that an employer is liable “if it knew or should have known 
of the harassment and failed to take appropriate actions to halt 
it.”
85
 Obviously, this decision expands employers’ potential liabil-
ity for claims of harassment, as liability now may attach if the 
employer knew or reasonably should have known of harassment 
inflicted on employees by third parties, but failed to take correc-
tive action to prevent the encounters leading to the harassment. 
Finally, in Dulaney v. Packing Corp. of America, the Fourth 
Circuit held that the plaintiff presented enough evidence to sur-
vive summary judgment on her claims of sexual harassment and 
gender discrimination against her former employer.
86
 Dulaney al-
leged that her former manager conditioned her employment on 
Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1258 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003); Turnbull v. Topeka 
State Hosp., 255 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
79. Id. at 603.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 608 (citing Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir.
1990)). 
84. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
85. See Cromer Food Servs., Inc., 414 F. App’x at 607.
86. 673 F.3d 323, 333 (4th Cir. 2012).
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receipt of sexual favors.
87
 In granting summary judgment, the dis-
trict court held that, because the employer took no tangible em-
ployment action against Dulaney, it was entitled to invoke the 
Faragher-Ellerth defense as a matter of law.
88
 Consistent with 
this holding, the district court found (i) the employer exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually 
harassing behavior and (ii) Dulaney unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of the employer’s preventative or corrective opportuni-
ties.
89
 On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit applied the Fara-
gher-Ellerth definition of “tangible employment action” to find 
that evidence in the record, including a company memorandum 
labeling Dulaney as “terminated,” presented a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the plaintiff actually did suffer a tan-
gible employment action.
90
 Moreover, the court found that other 
evidence in the record (e.g., a company manager laughing at 
Dulaney when she first complained) at least suggested a nexus 
between the plaintiff’s harassment and termination, such that 
summary judgment was inappropriate.
91
 
Altogether, these cases illustrate the Fourth Circuit’s willing-
ness to review the entire record with scrutiny when presented 
with grants of summary judgment in the employer’s favor, but on-
ly where genuine disputes of material fact in the record have been 
ignored or marginalized or when the corrective actions proffered 
by the employer are not actually prompt or corrective. 
IV. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 
A.  Americans with Disabilities Act 
This year, the Fourth Circuit established unequivocally that an 
employee’s inability to work overtime does not constitute a disa-
bility under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
92
 In Bo-
87. See id. at 325–26 (citations and footnotes omitted).
88. Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 7:09-cv-00063, 2010 WL 4736615, at *4
(W.D. Va. Nov. 15, 2010); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 
(1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 764–65 (1998). 
89. See Dulaney, 2010 WL 4736615, at *5.
90. See Dulaney, 673 F.3d at 331–32.
91. Id. at 333.
92. See Boitnott v. Corning Inc., 669 F.3d 172, 176 (4th Cir. 2012).
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itnott v. Corning Inc., the court affirmed the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff employee’s ina-
bility to work overtime due to cardiac difficulties and treatment 
did not constitute a disability.
93
 
Corning, in an effort to promote efficiency and continuity in its 
manufacturing processes, limited its workforce primarily to 
twelve-hour shifts, rotating its employees between daytime and 
nighttime schedules.
94
 After experiencing cardiac difficulties and 
a diagnosis of leukemia, Boitnott, an employee of Corning, was 
medically restricted to eight work hours per day.
95
 Based on his 
ability to work a normal workweek total of forty hours, “Corning 
took the position that [Boitnott did not qualify as] disabled under 
the ADA.”
96
 Because the twelve-hour shift schedule expectation 
exceeded his medical restriction, Boitnott did not return to work 
but, instead, applied for long-term disability benefits.
97
 Not sur-
prisingly, these long-term disability benefits subsequently were 
terminated because of Boitnott’s ability to work a normal forty-
hour workweek.
98
 At the same time, Boitnott filed a charge of dis-
crimination with the EEOC, alleging that Corning failed to afford 
him a “reasonable accommodation” by refusing to allow him to 
work only eight hours per day.
99
 Boitnott asserted that his inabil-
ity to work more than eight hours per day, as a result of his phys-
ical impairments, rendered him “disabled” under the ADA.
100
  
Thereafter, Corning and the employee union of which Boitnott 
was a member entered into negotiations and authorized a new 
position limited to eight-hour shifts; Boitnott was hired for the 
position and formally returned to work with Corning in Septem-
ber 2005.
101
 The lawsuit, however, remained. 
The Fourth Circuit, in affirming summary judgment for Corn-
ing, held that “an inability to work overtime does not constitute a 
‘substantial’ limitation on a major life activity under the ADA.”
102
 
93. See id. at 172–73.
94. Id. at 173 (citations omitted).
95. Id. (citations omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citation omitted).
99. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id. at 172. 
101. Id. at 174 (citations omitted). 
102. Id. at 176. 
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In support of its decision, the court noted that, importantly, “[a]ll 
circuits courts which have addressed this issue have held that an 
employee under the ADA is not ‘substantially’ limited” in “‘one or 
more major life activities’ if [he] is capable of working a normal 
forty hour work week but is not able to work overtime.”
103
 
This decision makes clear that employers do not have to pro-
vide reasonable accommodation for employees who can work 
normal forty-hour workweeks but are not physically able to work 
additional hours, so long as the employee’s inability to work over-
time does not “significantly restrict[]” the employee’s ability to 
perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs, as compared to 
the average person of comparable training, skills, and abilities.
104
 
Put more simply, the employer does not have to offer any accom-
modation so long as the employee’s inability to work overtime 
does not restrict him from working in his chosen field. In this 
case, there was no evidence that Boitnott’s inability to work over-
time “‘significantly restricted’ his ability to perform a class of jobs 
or a broad range of jobs” and, therefore, the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment for Corning was affirmed.
105
 
B.  Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
In January 2011, the Fourth Circuit clarified that even gov-
ernmental bodies are not exempt from an EEOC-issued subpoena 
requesting personnel information relating to an investigation.
106
 
In EEOC v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, Judge 
Wilkinson held that the state utility’s assertion of legislative im-
munity and privilege was “premature” and, thus, did not provide 
a basis for the court to decline to enforce the subpoena.
107
 The 
court reasoned that, under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
 103. Id. at 175 (citing Bialko v. Quaker Oats Co., 434 F. App’x 139, 142 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 598–99 (6th Cir. 2002); Miller v. Sw. Bell Tel. 
Co., No. 01-21318, 2002 WL 31415083, at *5 (5th Cir. Oct. 7, 2002); Kellogg v. Union Pac. 
R.R. Co., 233 F.3d 1083, 1087–88 (8th Cir. 2000); Taylor v. Nimock’s Oil Co., 214 F.3d 957, 
960–61 (8th Cir. 2000); Tardie v. Rehab. Hosp. of R.I., 168 F.3d 538, 542 (1st Cir. 1999); 
Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1145 (8th Cir. 1999); Parkinson v. Anne Arundel 
Med. Ctr., Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 511, 514–15 (D. Md. 2002)). 
 104. See id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3), app. at 390 (2011)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
105. See id. at 176–77. 
106. See EEOC v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 631 F.3d 174, 177 (4th Cir. 
2011)). 
107. Id. 
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ment Act, the EEOC has authority to investigate claims of age 
discrimination.
108
 Along with this investigative authority, “Con-
gress gave the EEOC commensurate authority to subpoena in-
formation and gave district courts jurisdiction to enforce those 
subpoenas.”
109
 Although the EEOC’s subpoena authority has its 
limits, including the evidentiary limitation of legislative privilege, 
the court held that, while it recognized “the importance of legisla-
tive immunity and privilege, [it did] not believe the EEOC’s modi-
fied subpoena threaten[ed] them at the present time.”
110
 The court 
noted that the EEOC limited its subpoena in an effort to avoid 
requesting potentially privileged information from the sanitary 
commission; accordingly, the court concluded it had “no basis for 
not enforcing the subpoena.”
111
 
V. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND TRADE SECRETS 
A.  Restrictive Covenants 
Although Virginia is regarded as an employer-friendly state, 
recognizing only a very narrow exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine, Virginia courts strongly disfavor covenants not to 
compete as restraints on trade. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently reiterated this position 
in Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer, holding that a 
non-compete provision restricting the employee from working in 
the same industry in “any” capacity, even indirectly, was over-
broad and unenforceable.
112
 
In Shaffer, the employer sued Shaffer, its former employee, and 
Shaffer’s new employer, alleging breach of contract and tortious 
interference with contract.
113
 During his employment with Home 
Paramount, Shaffer signed a non-competition agreement in which 
he agreed not to “engage directly or indirectly or concern himself[] 
in any manner whatsoever in the carrying on or conducting the 
business of exterminating, pest control, termite control and/or 
108. See id. at 180 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(a) (2006)). 
109. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(a)). 
110. Id. at 180, 182 (citing Burtnick v. McLean, 76 F.3d 611, 613 (4th Cir. 1996)). 
111. See id. at 185. 
112. 282 Va. 412, 414, 419, 718 S.E.2d 762, 763, 765 (2011). 
113. See id. at 415, 718 S.E.2d at 763. 
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fumigation services.”
114
 The provision set forth a time limitation of 
two years.
115
 Shaffer, however, resigned from Home Paramount 
and, within this two year period, accepted employment with an-
other pest control company.
116
 
In assessing the enforceability of this restriction, the Supreme 
Court of Virginia noted it will enforce a non-competition agree-
ment only if the employer proves it is “narrowly drawn to protect 
the employer’s legitimate business interest, is not unduly burden-
some on the employee’s ability to earn a living, and is not against 
public policy.”
117
 As part of this assessment, the court considered 
the “‘function, geographic scope, and duration’ elements of the re-
striction.”
118
 Regarding the “function” prong, the court reasoned 
that valid restrictions prohibit “an employee from engaging in ac-
tivities that actually or potentially compete with the employee’s 
former employer.”
119
 When, as here, the employer seeks to limit its 
former employee from working for its competition in any capacity, 
the employer must establish a legitimate business interest for do-
ing so or the restriction will fail.
120
 
The court found that Home Paramount failed to establish any 
legitimate business interest in support of its broad restriction and 
observed that the provision “prohibits Shaffer from working for 
[his new employer] or any other business in the pest control in-
dustry in any capacity,” including even indirect engagement.
121
 
Accordingly, the court concluded that the provision was overbroad 
and unenforceable.
122
 
114. Id. at 414–15, 718 S.E.2d at 763. 
115. Id. at 415, 718 S.E.2d at 763. 
116. See id. 
117. Id., 718 S.E.2d at 763–64 (quoting Omniplex World Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Investiga-
tions Servs., Inc., 270 Va. 246, 249, 618 S.E.2d 340, 342 (2005)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 118. Id. at 415–16, 718 S.E.2d at 764 (quoting Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 581, 544 
S.E.2d 666, 678 (2001)). 
 119. Id. at 417, 718 S.E.2d at 765 (quoting Omniplex World Servs. Corp., 270 Va. at 
249, 618 S.E.2d at 342)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120. Id. at 417–18, 718 S.E.2d at 765 (citing Modern Env’ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 263 Va. 
491, 495, 561 S.E.2d 694, 696 (2002)). 
121. Id. at 418, 718 S.E.2d at 765. 
122. Id. at 420, 718 S.E.2d at 766. 
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B.  Trade Secrets 
In stark contrast, Virginia courts, through application of the 
Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“VUTSA”),
123
 place a much 
lighter burden on employers advancing claims of trade secrets vi-
olations. 
This year, the Supreme Court of Virginia highlighted this more 
lenient standard in Collelo v. Geographic Services, Inc., holding 
that the VUTSA does not require that one accused of misappro-
priating a trade secret also must actually use the trade secret to 
compete with the holder of the trade secret.
124
 Geographic Ser-
vices performs “geographic names, or ‘geonames,’ work.”
125
 In 
2006, Geographic Services hired Collelo and trained him to per-
form its geonames work.
126
 In so doing, Geographic Services ex-
posed Collelo to confidential information and purported trade se-
crets.
127
 Given the nature of his employment, Collelo signed an 
employment contract containing a non-disclosure provision that 
prohibited Collelo from disclosing Geographic Services’ confiden-
tial information “to any person or entity without first obtaining 
[Geographic Services’] written consent.”
128
 In 2008, Collelo re-
signed from Geographic Services and accepted a position with 
Boeing, working in a non-geonames capacity.
129
 Soon thereafter, 
however, Geographic Services learned that Collelo was perform-
ing geonames work and, accordingly, advised Boeing that Collelo 
was violating the non-disclosure provision in his employment con-
tract.
130
 After Geographic Services learned that Collelo continued 
to perform geonames work at Boeing, it filed a motion for judg-
ment against Collelo and Boeing for breach of contract, tortious 
interference with a contract, and violations of the VUTSA.
131
 
At trial, the defendants filed a motion to strike, arguing, among 
other things, that Geographic Services offered no evidence that 
123. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to -343 (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Cum. Supp. 2012). 
 124. 283 Va. 56, 71, 721 S.E.2d 508, 516 (2012) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-336 (Repl. 
Vol. 2006)). 
125. Id. at 61, 721 S.E.2d at 510. 
126. Id. at 62, 721 S.E.2d at 511. 
127. Id.  
128. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
129. Id. at 63, 721 S.E.2d at 511. 
130. Id.  
131. Id., 721 S.E.2d at 511–12. 
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Boeing competes directly with Geographic Services for geonames 
work and, consequently, Collelo could not be found in breach of 
the non-disclosure provision at issue.
132
 Reasoning that Boeing 
and Geographic Services were not market competitors, the trial 
court granted defendants’ motion.
133
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed in part and 
affirmed in part.
134
 Specifically, the court held that, in order for 
the trade secrets claim to be actionable under the VUTSA, Boeing 
did not have to actually use the misappropriated trade secret to 
compete with Geographic Services.
135
 Accordingly, the trial court 
erred in granting the defendants’ motion to strike under the 
VUTSA.
136
 Despite this holding, the supreme court affirmed the 
trial court’s dismissal of the breach of contract and tortious inter-
ference with a contract claims because Geographic Services failed 
to present sufficient evidence of any damages.
137
 
As a result of the Collelo case, the message to employers and 
employees is clear. Misappropriation is complete—and actiona-
ble—merely by disclosure of the trade secret without consent or 
acquisition by a person who “knows or has reason to know that 
the trade secret was acquired by improper means.”
138
 
VI. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Finally, in a matter of first impression, the Fourth Circuit clar-
ified what constitutes “protected activity” under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”).
139
 In Minor v. Bostwick Laboratories, 
Inc., the Fourth Circuit applied recent precedent from the Su-
preme Court to hold that intra-company complaints qualify as 
“protected activities” under the FLSA.
140
 
132. Id. at 64, 721 S.E.2d at 512. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 80, 721 S.E.2d at 520. 
135. Id. at 71, 721 S.E.2d at 516 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-336 (Repl. Vol. 2006)) 
(“Accordingly, the Trade Secrets Act does not require that one who is accused of misappro-
priating a trade secret use the allegedly misappropriated trade secret to compete with the 
holder of the trade secret.”). 
136. Id. at 79, 721 S.E.2d at 520. 
137. See id. at 76, 721 S.E.2d at 518. 
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-336 (Cum. Supp. 2012). 
139. See Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc., 669 F.3d 428, 431 (4th Cir. 2012).  
140. Id. at 436–37 (citing Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 
___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1333 (2011)). 
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Specifically, the Fourth Circuit addressed whether a complaint 
lodged by Minor, a unionized employee of Bostwick, during a de-
partment meeting—as opposed to a complaint filed with a court 
or government agency—triggered the protection of the FLSA’s an-
ti-retaliation provision.
141
 During this meeting with Bostwick’s 
chief operating officer, Minor complained that she believed her 
supervisor willfully violated the FLSA by altering employees’ 
time sheets to reflect that they had not worked overtime when, in 
fact, they had.
142
 Six days later, Bostwick terminated Minor’s em-
ployment, explaining that there was “too much conflict with [her] 
supervisors and the relationship just [was not] working.”
143
 
Minor filed a complaint against Bostwick in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia alleging that Bostwick fired her in retaliation for 
engaging in protected activity, as defined by the FLSA’s anti-
retaliation provision.
144
 In ruling on Bostwick’s motion to dismiss, 
the district court held that complaints are protected by the 
FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision only if they constitute a formal, 
official proceeding.
145
 Because Minor alleged only that she was 
discharged in retaliation for reporting the alleged violations to 
company management during this department meeting, the dis-
trict court granted Bostwick’s motion to dismiss.
146
 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit looked to the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 
Corp., in which the Court resolved whether an employee’s oral 
complaints qualified as a protected activity under the FLSA’s an-
ti-retaliation provision.
147
 In holding that such oral complaints did 
qualify as protected activity, the Court explained that “[t]o fall 
within the scope of the antiretaliation provision, a complaint 
must be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer 
to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an asser-
tion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their protec-
tion.”
148
 Although the Court declined to address whether an intra-
141. Id. at 431. 
142. Id. at 430. 
143. Id. (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
144. Id. at 430–31 (footnote omitted). 
145. Id. at 431. 
146. Id.  
147. Id. at 432 (citing Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. ___, 
___ , 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1330 (2011)). 
148. Kasten, 563 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1335. 
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company complaint constitutes a protected activity under the 
FLSA expressly, it framed the fair notice requirement in terms of 
whether a “reasonable employer” would understand a particular 
complaint to be an assertion of rights under the FLSA.
149
 
Although it adopted the Kasten Court’s reasoning, the Fourth 
Circuit recognized that the case was not directly controlling and, 
consequently, reviewed the anti-retaliation provision inde-
pendently and concluded that the statute’s language, “filed any 
complaint,” is ambiguous as to whether intra-company com-
plaints qualify as protected activity.
150
 Finally, after considering 
the purpose of the FLSA and its anti-retaliation provision, the 
Fourth Circuit declined to adopt the district court’s formalistic 
approach, instead holding that “[a]llowing intracompany com-
plaints to constitute protected activity . . . comports with the 
statute’s objectives as described by Congress’s findings and the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of those findings.”
151
 Accordingly, 
the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s 
grant of the employer’s motion to dismiss.
152
 
When viewed together with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kasten, this decision may tie the hands of employers seeking to 
discipline or terminate employees who arguably have engaged in 
protected activity under the FLSA through an intra-company 
complaint. Although any employee complaint must provide ade-
quate and fair notice to the employer and be “sufficiently clear 
and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it,” these 
decisions make clear that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision 
does not merely cover formal and official complaints to courts or 
administrative bodies.
153
 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held con-
sistently that the FLSA “must not be interpreted or applied in a 
narrow, grudging manner,”
154
 and the majority of circuits have fo-
cused on the FLSA’s remedial purpose in holding that intra-
company complaints constitute protected activities.
155
 For this 
149. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1334–35 (citations omitted). 
150. Minor, 669 F.3d at 433–35.  
151. Id. at 437. 
152. Id. at 439. 
153. Kasten, 563 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1335; Minor, 669 F.3d at 436–37. 
154. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944). 
155. See, e.g., Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008); 
Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); EEOC v. White & Son 
Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989); Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 
387 (10th Cir. 1984); Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975). 
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reason, employers should expect courts to apply a more flexible, 
interpretive approach in addressing whether an employee’s criti-
cism qualifies for protection under the FLSA’s anti-retaliation 
provision. 
VII. CONCLUSION
There were several important developments in labor and em-
ployment law, on both the federal and state levels, during the 
past two years. A federal court in Virginia clarified that social 
media activity must constitute “actual statements” in order for an 
employee to take shelter under the First Amendment from em-
ployment discipline, and another court expanded even further the 
scope of retaliation claims, such that a third party can constitute 
an “aggrieved” person able to make a claim under Title VII. Fur-
ther, the Fourth Circuit addressed a split between its sister 
courts when it held that employers can be liable for the harass-
ment of non-employees if the employer knew or should have 
known of the harassing conduct yet failed to take prompt, correc-
tive action to mitigate interaction. Significantly, not all of these 
cases expanded the rights of employees, as the Fourth Circuit al-
so clarified that an employee’s inability to work overtime does not 
constitute a “disability” under the ADA. 
Altogether, although Virginia remains an employer-friendly 
state, Virginia courts continue to scrutinize the acts of employers 
to apply—and sometimes expand—the protections available to 
employees. While the courts’ application of the VUTSA may ease 
the burden for employers asserting trade secrets violations, we 
saw the Fourth Circuit, in three separate cases, indicate its will-
ingness to scrutinize district courts’ grants of summary judgment 
in the employer’s favor, requiring lower courts to consider the en-
tire record before them and not marginalize issues which may be 
genuine disputes of material fact. Ultimately, however, summary 
judgment still remains a viable conclusion for employers defend-
ing employment-related cases. 
